



















Why do we have two eyes? Why is it the female mosquito that bites? Why do cats have sharp teeth? The answer to these fascinating (though I admit, from a biological point of view, probably not the most interesting) questions is supposed to be provided by what is usually called adaptation-explanations. Adaptation-explanations aim to explain the supposed or real teleology of the world. As Brandon says: 

Adaptation-explanations [are] answers to what-for questions. Questions concerning putative adaptations, an anteater's tongue, the structure of the human eye, or the waggle-dance of honeybees - are naturally formulated using what-for. (One might also ask the same questions using why or how-come. The distinction is not a simple syntactic one.) In contrast, we balk at using what-for in formulating other evolutionary questions, such as Why is hydrogen more abundant in the universe than uranium? (Brandon 1985: 86-87. cf. Brandon 1996: 30-45.). 

In other words, in adaptation-explanations the explanandum is "the fit between organisms and environment" (Sterelny 2001, p. 4.). But what is the explanans? The obvious suggestion is that the explanans is a selection process. Adaptations should be explained with reference to selection processes that shaped the traits to be explained. Thus we can explain why certain creatures have the traits they have by referring to why these traits were selected in the course of evolution. 
Unfortunately, it has been argued repeatedly that contrary to our hopes to use selection to answer the questions of vital importance quoted above, selection cannot play a role in explaining adaptation. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the recent debate about whether such explanations are possible. This debate has been quite severe in the last ten years or so. The view that selection can play a role in explaining adaptation has been defended mainly by Karen Neander (1995a, 1995b, see also Millikan 1990, Nanay 2002). On the other side of the trench the central figure is Elliott Sober (1984, 1995, see also Walsh 1998, Dretske 1988, 1990 and Cummins 1975). After Sober 1995 and Walsh 1998’s arguments, the position of Neander’s side appears rather shaky.​[1]​ The aim of this paper is to provide munitions to this camp. 
	Before turning to the actual argument, it is important to clarify the framework of the debate. First, it is important to draw a distinction between the scope of this debate and that of adaptationism.​[2]​ The adaptationist claim is that if an organism has a trait, then there is (or at least tends to be) a selection process that explains this organism’s having this trait. In other words, if organism o has trait A, then there is (or at least tends to be) a selection process that explains why x has trait A. 
Contrast this with the central claim of the debate about the explanatory power of selection in explaining adaptations: if x has trait A and if x is in a population where trait A has been selected over trait B, then this selection process (partly) explains why x has trait A.
Both are concerned with the explanation of adaptation with the help of selection. But they are very different indeed. The second claim does not assume that all traits have adaptation-explanations. Also, the adaptationist takes the explanandum (adaptation) for granted and is looking for an explanans (selection), whereas our question goes the opposite way: it regards the explanans (selection) as given, and asks about the explanandum (adaptation). The two questions are orthogonal. 
	Hence, I will assume in what follows that the question under scrutiny is the following: if in a population a trait has been selected over other traits, can this explain (at least partially) why organisms in that population have this trait? In other words, I take it for granted that we know the selection process, and we want to tell why certain organisms have the traits they have. 
I would like to narrow down the question even further and focus on whether cumulative selection can play a role in explaining adaptation or not.​[3]​ There are non-cumulative selection processes that cannot play any role in explaining adaptation: the ones whereby the replicators do not change from generation to generation. The most successful replicator may spread and make all the others extinct, but by doing so it will not change. An example could be the clay crystal that grows faster than the other crystals in the same pool (Cf. Bedau 1991: 650 -654, Walsh 2000: 142-143.). After a certain time the fastest growing crystal will be the only one in the pool, but its structure will not change in the selection process.​[4]​ This is an example of a non-cumulative selection process that does not play a role in explaining any adaptation. 
Leaving the non-cumulative case aside, I will focus on the question whether cumulative selection can play a role in explaining adaptation or not. Also, it needs to be emphasised that the question is whether cumulative selection can play a role in explaining adaptation and not whether it can fully explain adaptation. 
Two strong arguments have been given in favour of the claim that no selection process whatever can play a role in explaining adaptations. The first one is that selection is a negative force, it eliminates, but it does not create, hence it cannot play a role in explaining adaptation. According to the second, selection cannot play a role in explaining adaptation, since selection is a population-level phenomenon, whereas adaptation occurs on the individual level. These arguments are often provided together, but I take them to be logically independent. I will take them in turn. 

II.	Selection as a Negative Force

Sober claims that selection is a negative force: it does not create, it only destroys (Sober 1984, Ch. 5.). The upshot is that random mutations create a variety of individuals (or genetic plans) and selection eliminates some of these, but the explanation of the traits of one of these individuals is provided by random mutation and inheritance (and, of course, some developmental factors), not by the elimination process. Selection can explain why certain individuals were eliminated, but it cannot explain the traits of the ones that were not eliminated. 
	Karen Neander analyses this argument, which she calls the argument for the Negative View of selection, in great detail (Neander 1995a). She argues that selection does play a role in explaining why an individual has the traits it has, but only a certain kind of selection: cumulative selection. But she admits that Sober’s criticism is valid for non-cumulative selection processes. 
	First, it is important to make some comments on the terminology Neander and Sober use. More eminently, it is crucial to examine whether the opponents and the advocates of this argument mean the same thing when they talk about selection. Sober analyses mutation as something distinct from selection. The question is how consistent this is with the generally accepted notion of selection. 
According to David Hull, selection consists of “repeated cycles of replication and environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be differential”.​[5]​ He analyses selection, conceived traditionally as “heritable variation in fitness”, as cycles of a copying process (replication) and the interaction with the environment. 
If we accept this concept of selection, it is hard to see how Sober could maintain that it is not selection, but mutation that plays a role in explaining adaptation, since in Hull’s picture, mutation (replication with variation) is one of the two steps of the selection process. If selection consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction, then replication is obviously part of the selection process. And this replication process must be differential; hence, replication with variation, i.e., mutation, is part of the selection process.​[6]​ According to Hull, selection is replication with variation followed by interaction. In the light of this, it is a surprising claim that selection cannot play a causal role in explaining adaptations, while mutation can, if mutation is part of the selection process. 
This, however, would be a too easy way to oppose Sober’s argument. He obviously means something else by selection. It is reasonable to say that what he means is what Hull means by interaction.​[7]​ Interaction is a negative force: all it does is to eliminate some of the replicators. 
And here we run into another confusion. Hull’s notion of selection is a notion of cumulative selection. If selection is “the repeated cycles of replication and environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be differential” (my emphasis), then the changes of the replicators must be transmitted to the next generation. If Sober takes Hull’s notion of interaction to be selection, then it is difficult to see how he could allow for cumulative selection.​[8]​ Neander, on the other hand, explicitly talks about cumulative selection, when she talks about selection; she even admits that non-cumulative selection cannot play a role in explaining adaptation, but cumulative selection can. Could it be the case that Neander uses a notion of selection that is similar to Hull’s, whereas Sober uses a notion of selection that is more similar to Hull’s notion of interaction? Is it possible that the whole debate is terminological?
I think not. It seems that Neander accepts the way Sober refers to selection when she argues against his position. In Hull’s terminology, both are concerned with the question whether interaction is causally relevant to the explanation of adaptation or not. This, of course, leaves open the possibility to argue that selection in Hull’s original sense does play a causal role in the explanation of adaptation, but this is a possibility I cannot pursue here. Instead, I would like to examine further the Sober-Neander debate that we managed to localise as the question whether interaction is causally relevant to the explanation of adaptation or not. 
Sober’s argument is that, in Hull’s terms, it is replication that explains why an individual has a certain trait. Environmental interaction (of the previous generation) does not play any role in such explanation. The gist of his argument is the following. Let us take an organism that has two offspring, one of which has a certain trait A, whereas the other does not. Since trait A is advantageous to these organisms in the given environment, the second offspring dies, whereas the first will have offspring, one of which, call her individual x, also has trait A. The question is of course, what explains the presence of this trait A. Sober’s answer is that it is the mutation as a result of which A appeared in x’s mother and inheritance, as a result of which A was transmitted to x. The explanation is simple: A appeared as a result of a random mutation in x’s mother and then x inherited it from her mother. What explains the presence of the trait is, hence, mutation and inheritance. Selection is irrelevant, since the fact that x’s uncle died or not does not have any causal influence on whether x has trait A or not (Sober 1984. See also Sober 1995, p. 393, Cummins 1975, pp. 750-751.). 
I think this argument is flawed.​[9]​ It would be a correct argument if the environmental resources were unlimited. They are not.​[10]​ First, very simplistically: provided that environmental resources are limited, if I eat, my sister does not. If x’s mother survived and reached reproductive age, it is because she had enough to eat. If we assume that the environment can maintain only one of these organisms, she could not eat enough, unless her brother died. Hence, x’s uncle’s death played a causal role in x’s mother’s survival and reaching reproductive age. Since x could not have inherited trait A from her mother unless she reached reproductive age, the fact that x’s uncle died plays a very significant role in the causal explanation of the fact that x has trait A. Which is just the opposite of what Sober claims. 
The structure of my argument is the following. Sober and I agree that inheritance plays an important role in the causal explanation of why a certain organism has a certain trait. That x has trait A is partly explained by the fact that x inherited A from her mother. On the other hand, x could not have inherited A from her mother unless her mother reached reproductive age. Further, x's mother could not have reached reproductive age unless x's uncle died. Therefore, the fact that x’s uncle died plays a very significant role in the causal explanation of the fact that x has trait A.
More slowly and less simplistically: take a population of organisms. The population size is 100. It has always been 100 or less, because the environmental resources can maintain only this size. I take the environment to be stable. There has been no migration. All the 100 organisms have trait B, when a mutation occurs and trait A, whose fitness is higher than that of trait B, eventually goes to fixation. The question is whether the elimination of the organisms with trait B in the past generations plays a causal role in the explanation of why organisms in the present population has trait A. If there were no environmental limitations, the answer would be no, in accordance with Sober’s argument. But there are environmental limitations: the environment can only maintain a population of 100. Whether or not these organisms with trait B were eliminated alters the chances of the survival of organisms with trait A, since, after all, they all compete for the same environmental resources. If an organism with trait B (call it b) is eliminated, then there will be more environmental resources available for organisms with trait A. The probability of the survival of an organism with trait A is higher given the death of b than the probability of its survival given that b does not die (all things being equal).​[11]​ Thus, the elimination of organisms with trait B contributes to the survival of organisms with trait A. Since organisms in the present generation inherited trait A from these organisms with trait A, we can conclude that the elimination of organisms with trait B does have a causal role in explaining why organisms in the present population has trait A.​[12]​ 
I take Neander to make a similar point, but in a rather sketchy way: 

Gardeners know that annual pruning doesn’t merely eliminate old growth, it also channels and directs new growth. […] Just so, the tree of life would not have had all of its actual branches, just some more, if there had been no natural selection. (Neander 1995a, p. 76.) 

Neander, however, claims that it is the cumulative character of selection that makes it a positive force. Instead, I emphasise the limitations of environmental resources. 

III.	The Scope of Selection

Sober’s second argument is more challenging. It claims that selection cannot play a role in explaining adaptation, since the explanandum and the explanans are phenomena at different levels: selection is a population-level phenomenon, whereas adaptation occurs on the individual level. (Sober 1984, 1995, Walsh 2000). Selection can explain the frequencies of traits in populations, but it cannot explain why individual organisms have certain traits (Sober 1984, p. 150, Sober 1995, p. 384.). In other words, it cannot explain why I have two eyes, why this cat has sharp teeth, etc. Walsh 1998 elaborates on this argument in more detail, thus, I will analyse both Sober’s and Walsh’s argument. Whereas Sober handles this argument (about the scope of selection) and the one about selection being a negative force together, Walsh focuses on the former. 
	Sober and Walsh claim that selection can provide only population-level explanation: it can only explain why the population consists of individuals who have a certain trait. Adaptation explanation, however, is supposed to be an individual-level explanation. It needs to explain why this individual has the traits it does. To go back to Sober’s classic analogy (Sober 1984, p. 149, 1995, p. 384.), if the admission criterion for a class is that the student must be able to read at the third grade level, then what explains that Sam can read at the third grade level is not the admission criterion (that is, the selection process), but, say, the fact that his grandmother spent a lot of time with him reading. The moral is that even though the admission criterion explains why the class (the population) reads at the third grade level, but it does not play a role in explaining why a certain individual, Sam, reads at the third grade level. 
	The differences between these two kinds of explanation can be formalised in the following way (see Walsh 1998, p. 250). The selection processes will provide the explanation: 

(1a) If there is selection in the class for being able to read at the third grade level, then if x is in this class and x can read at the third grade level, then this selection (partly) explains why (if x is in the class, then x can read at the third grade level). 

The kind of explanation that would be needed to explain why Sam can read is the following: 

(2a) x (if x is in the class and there is selection in the class for being able to read at the third grade level, then this selection (partly) explains why x can read at the third grade level).

Similarly, selection processes will provide the following explanation: 

(1) If in a population trait A has been selected over trait B, then if x is in this population and if x has trait A, then this selection (partly) explains why (if x is in this population, then x has trait A). 

The kind of explanation that would be needed to explain why a certain individual has trait A: 

(2) x (if x has trait A and if x is in a population where trait A has been selected over trait B, then this selection (partly) explains why x has trait A).

(1) is generally agreed on (Walsh 1998). The question is whether (2) is true or not. Sober and Walsh say no, Neander says yes. Walsh aims to show that Neander has three arguments for (2), each of which only manages to prove (1). Since (2) obviously does not follow from (1), selection processes cannot explain why a certain individual has a certain trait. 
	I think Walsh is right that Neander never manages to prove (2), but this does not mean that (2) is false. Here is an argument for (2), which is very similar to the one I offered in the last section. 
	Again, let us take good old x’s family. X has trait A. X has A because x’s mother had A and x inherited it from her. All of the siblings of x’s mother have trait B. X’s mother was able to transmit it to her offspring, x, because she survived and reached reproductive age. Without her reaching reproductive age, x obviously would not have trait A, because she would not exist. But A’s mother survived and reached reproductive age, because the environmental resources were enough to maintain only one organism and because x’s uncles died. If x’s uncles had not died, x’s mother would not have survived and hence x could not have inherited trait A. Hence, x’s having trait A is at least partly explained causally by the fact that x’s uncles did not survive. 
All of the steps of the argument in the previous paragraph were claims at the individual level of description. Now comes the population level element in the explanation. The fact that x’s uncles did not survive is causally explained by selection processes: by the selective advantage of trait A over trait B. This Sober and Walsh would grant (this is claim (1) above). What they deny is not that selection can play a role in explaining the eliminated cases, but that it cannot play a role in explaining the not eliminated cases. What I aimed to show is that selection does play a role in explaining the not eliminated cases indirectly. This explanation consists of two steps: (a) Selection explains the eliminated cases. This is the step of the explanation where a population level phenomenon explains and individual level one. (b) The fact that a certain organism has a certain trait is partially explained by these eliminated other organisms. This holds because of the limitations of the environmental resources. Also, this second step of the explanation is entirely an individual level explanation. 
There is no scope error: this explanation explains why a certain organism has a certain trait. It is an explanation of kind (2) I mentioned above: 

(2) x (if x has trait A and if x is in a population where trait A has been selected over trait B, then this selection (partly) explains why x has trait A).

Finally, a possible objection needs to be addressed. I have trait C, which is by no means advantageous for me or for anyone else, but which I inherited from my mother and only my mother had it among her siblings. My uncle died because a brick fell on his head on the street. Couldn’t we run the same explanation? If so, doesn’t it leads to very counterintuitive consequences? Let us proceed step by step and see what the differences between this case and the selection case are. 
I have C because my mother had C and I inherited it from her. All of the siblings of my mother have trait D. My mother was able to transmit C to me, because she survived and reached reproductive age. Without her reaching reproductive age, I obviously would not have trait C, because I would not exist. My mother survived and reached reproductive age, because the environmental resources were enough to maintain only one organism and because my uncle died. If my uncle had not died, my mother would not have survived and hence I could not have inherited trait C. Hence, my having trait C is at least partly explained causally by the fact that my uncle did not survive. So far everything seems analogous between the two cases (given that there are severe limitation on the environmental resources). 




A note on the relevance of this debate. It may seem a technical and not very interesting question whether selection can play a role in explaining adaptations. In fact, its relevance goes way beyond the limits of philosophy of biology. A very important question in the philosophy of mind is whether it is possible to give evolutionary explanation to the problem of the intentionality of mental states.​[14]​ 
The purpose of this approach, which is sometimes called teleosemantics, is to explain the intentionality of thought and language – the meaning of our words and the content of our thoughts – in evolutionary terms. The title of Millikan’s first book is in itself a manifesto: Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. 
Our thoughts are thoughts of something; they refer to something. If I think about a papaya, my thought is about a papaya; in other words, the content of my thought is ‘a papaya’. The explanation of mental content is the explanation of this relation between my papaya-thought and the papaya. The advocates of teleosemantics aim to explain this relation in evolutionary terms. The proposal (roughly) is that my thought has the content ‘papaya’ if the fact that papaya-thoughts indicate papayas has contributed to the survival of my evolutionary ancestors. More generally, a mental state R of an organism O has content X if the fact that Rs indicates Xs has contributed to the survival of the evolutionary ancestors of O. 
It is easy to see that this explanation is an adaptation-explanation: it aims to explain why an organism has a mental state R with content X with the help of the selection process that favoured having R over not having R in the population of the organism’s ancestors. In other words, it explains why a certain trait exists with the help of a selection process. Hence, unless it is possible to use selection processes in explaining why I have a certain mental content, the entire project of evolutionary teleosemantics would go down the drain. 
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^1	  Matthen 1999 criticized Sober's position, arguing that Sober's argument does not work if the selection process is sexual selection, but as Lewins 2001 pointed out, Matthen's argument is not conclusive. 
^2	  On the question of adaptationism pro and contra see: Gould – Vrba 1982, Gould – Lewontin 1979, Lewontin 1978, Dawkins 1976, Dennett 1995, just to mention the most well-known titles in the very extended literature. 
^3	  Cumulative selection is a selection process whereby the changes of the replicators accumulate: they are transmitted to the next generation. Natural selection, for example, is cumulative. 
^4	  The clay crystals, described in Bedau 1991 behave this way, and not the way Bedau himself explained.
^5	  Hull et al. 2001: 53. Cf. Hull 1981: 40-41. 
^6	  This is also true under different widespread definitions of selection, such as Darden and Cain’s. Note that Darden and Cain’s notion of selection is not necessarily a cumulative one, whereas Hull’s is. See also Nanay 2001. 
^7	  The same is true of Vrba’s concept of selection: “Selection is the interaction between heritable, emergent character variation and the environment […]” Vrba 1984: 319.
^8	  In fact, the notion of cumulative selection he endorses in footnote 10 of Sober 1995 definitely would not qualify as cumulative selection under Hull’s or Neander’s definition. 
^9	  I agree with Sober that if selection has no causal influence on whether x has A, then it cannot play a role in explaining why x has A. What I intend to question is the truth of the antecedent of this conditional. 
^10	  If the environmental resources were unlimited, there would be no selection. Some have argued against this claim claiming that "[…] natural selection works only among competing entities, but it is not necessary for the individuals of a species to be engaged in ecological competition for some limited resource" (Williams 1966, p. 32). Or, as Lewontin says: "[…] the element of competition between organisms for a resource in short supply is not integral to [Darwin's] argument. Natural selection occurs even when two bacterial strains are growing logarithmically in an excess of nutrient broth if they have different division times." (Lewontin 1970, p. 1.) I agree with the point made by Lennox and Wilson (1994) that the notion of selection these authors end up with can hardly be called selection. More importantly, if we accept Hull's definition of selection, then the examples Lewontin and Willams give do not count as selection process. 
^11	  Of course, this claim is true only if we add ceteris paribus clauses; if we fix the independent causal factors. This would filter out cases where the death of b obviously does not contribute to the survival of every organism that has trait A. Examples for such cases include (a) scenarios whereby only organisms with trait B can defend the population from a certain predator or (b) scenarios whereby there are strong alliances within the population. 
^12	  It could be objected that this argument only shows that selection explains why an individual exists but not why it has a certain trait. Note, however, that my claim was that selection partly explains why an organism has the trait it has. And since an organism's having a certain trait presupposes that this organism exists, the explanation of the existence of an organism is part of the explanation of its having a certain trait. 
^13	  In other words, in the two-step explanation we ran above, step (b) applies here, but step (a) does not.
^14	  Some references: Millikan 1984, 1993, Papineau 1987, 1993, Neander 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, Sterelny 2001 See also Fodor 1990, Dretske 1988, 2000.
